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BEYOND THE CURRENT EU CONCEPTION: 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO 
STRUCTURAL REFORM
For decades, the concept of “structural reform” has been dominant in the 
economic policy discourse of the EU and most of its member states, from 
Greece to Finland. The term gets its meaning mainly from neoclassical eco-
nomic theory, though there are also Schumpeterian and other elements. An 
analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the concept (which emerged in 
the 1980s and was spread through the Bretton Woods institutions and the 
OECD) reveals conceptual and theoretical ambiguities and factual weak-
nesses. While many of these weaknesses are related to unrealistic assump-
tions, I argue further that the realisticness of particular assumptions is dif-
ferent from the realism of the approach and relevance of the problematic. 
Second, to explore the limitations of the concept in its current meaning, I 
outline a brief genealogy of the concept of structure in social sciences and 
then juxtapose the economistic concept of structure with that of realist 
social theory. Third, I explore the implications of this deeper ontological 
conception of structure to the meaning and nature of possible structural 
reforms. Fourth, I give a few examples of alternative structural reforms to 
make my points more concrete. The envisioned programme of structural 
changes would amount to reversing the current EU strategy for growth. In 
the end, I summarise the overall argument.
Keywords: Efficient market hypothesis, hope, normativity, open system, 
rationality, realism, scale economies, social ontology, structure, supply-side 
economics
INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Without large-scale national fiscal packages supported by the ECB and its policies, the 
EU would be in its deepest politico-economic crisis ever in 2020–21. Some of the meas-
ures introduced are ground-breaking: monetary policy has become ever more “uncon-
ventional”; austerity is lifted; a part of new debt is mutualised, and the EU’s own re-
sources will be increased. However, some of these measures are meant to be temporary 
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only, implying, among other things, an eventual return to austerity. Meanwhile, the EU 
Commission continues to push for structural reforms (SR), as it has been for many years 
(the Structural Reform Support Programme was established in 2016 to facilitate their 
implementation in spite of continuous resistance). SRs are also a key part of the EU 
Covid-19 rescue package approved in summer 2020. 
What does the term SR mean? In several official EU texts, SRs are characterised 
only in vague generic terms, at times verging on euphemisms. “Structural reforms are 
policy measures designed to boost an economy’s competitiveness, growth potential and 
adjustment capacity” (Euronews 2019). They are “efforts to support job creation and 
sustainable growth” (EU Commission 2021a). Frequently, structural reforms are de-
fined negatively in contrast to short-term policies focussing on economic fluctuations 
and other acute problems (EU Commission 2019). Since the definition is to a degree 
negative and indirect, “structural” appears to be a leftover category that can include a 
variety of things. As Amandine Crespy and Pierre Vanheuverzwijn (2016, 63) note, “the 
substantial meaning of SR has been fuzzy and malleable enough to accompany the ‘lay-
ering’ of new objectives and instruments”. 
To illustrate the variety of meanings that may be attached to SRs, they may for exam-
ple include attempts to curb tax evasion. Alternatively, the perceived problem to which 
SRs are supposed to be a solution may be a shortage of labour resulting from a mis-
match between training and demand for particular skills. Some SRs have focused on 
efforts to reduce the so-called sustainability gap of an ageing society. This gap can be 
addressed by all kinds of means, for example by reducing public spending, increasing 
labour supply, stepping up production through supply-side reforms, and by pursuing 
scale economies in terms of increasing the size of administrative and productive units 
in the public or public-private sector. Also, various efforts to induce investments can be 
included in the SR reform packages.
Even though the term “structural reform” is not tied to a single well-defined con-
cept but involves multiple layers of meanings that can shift over time, it is reasonable to 
assume that in the EU practices there are some common assumptions about what is it 
that can boost competitiveness, growth potential, adjustment capacity, job creation, and 
sustainability. The basic idea can be found for example in the “Structural reforms for 
economic growth” www-page of the EU Commission (2021b): “Structural reforms tack-
le obstacles to the fundamental drivers of growth by liberalising labour, product, and 
service markets, thereby encouraging job creation and investment and improving pro-
ductivity” (italics HP). The idea that market liberalisation brings efficiency originates 
in the prevailing form of economics. Similarly, the distinction between short and long 
run comes from neoclassical economics (for discussions on the contested meanings of 
“neoclassical”, see Morgan 2016). 
HELSINKI GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 4/2021 HELSINKI GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 4/2021
6 7
From Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics (editions from 1890 to 1920) to var-
ious editions of Paul Samuelson’s classic textbook Economics (original 1948; cf. Samuel-
son and Nordhaus 2009), the short run is defined as a period in which output changes 
must use the same fixed amount of capital, while in the long run capital and all other 
factors are variable and there is free entry and exit of firms into and from the industry. 
This presupposes, however, particular circumstances such as free entry and exit, which 
may not occur. From this perspective, product market reforms must aim at lowering de 
facto barriers of entry to make markets work more efficiently; while for the same reason 
labour market reforms purport to make it easier to dismiss workers who are redundant 
given their skills and the market situation. 
In general, the typical assumption is that the optimal functioning of the market 
mechanism is hampered by something, typically by regulations, practices, or institu-
tions. At other times, however, the idea is rather that there is a problem such as unem-
ployment or the ageing of society that can be best addressed by means of stimulating 
economic growth. What may or may not stimulate growth is of course a contested issue 
even within mainstream economics, not to speak of the wider field including also var-
ious post-Keynesian, post-Marxian, institutional, evolutionary, and other non-main-
stream approaches. For the chief problems to be properly identified and the proposed 
structural changes to function in the desired way, the advocates of EU-type SRs must 
assume some combination of these four basic elements,1 though the fourth one may 
perhaps be seen as a mere auxiliary hypothesis:
1. The efficient market hypothesis conceived broadly (the first welfare theorem: 
perfectly competitive markets allocate resources Pareto-efficiently)
2. General supply-side view of the economy according to which better and stronger 
incentives and more freely operating market mechanism lead to various gains 
through improved efficiency (for example, lowering the tax burden on labour can 
induce growth)
3. A modernised version of the macro-economic doctrine of balanced budgets 
(sound financial management requires balancing budgets and reducing exces-
sive public debt over time)
4. Hypotheses about efficiency benefits of large-scale production
1 Already the Cecchini Report (Commission of the EC 1988) that provided the cost-benefit analysis for 
the Single Market explicitly assumes a harmonious and mutually reinforcing relationship between mi-
cro- and macroeconomic effects involving economics of allocation, economies of scale, competitiveness 
in world markets, x-efficiency and learning. The slogan of the report is: “All barriers [for the operation of 
the free single market] have to be removed”. For an outstanding analysis of the historical background, see 
Cafruny and Ryner 2017, 59-83.
HELSINKI GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 4/2021
8
Usually, the concept of SR seems to presuppose a textbook version of the model of per-
fect competition as a yardstick for measuring progress (1). The idea of perfect competi-
tion is also behind concepts such as “market distortion” (for example, distortive taxes). 
It may be acknowledged that there are winners and losers and that in the short run 
reforms often generate transitory costs, but in the long run, the effects are assumed to 
be beneficial (Bassanini and Cingano 2018). Often, the assumptions behind SRs come 
close to supply-side economics; including notions such as that economic growth can be 
stimulated by lowering certain taxes and by improving the overall business environ-
ment (2). So-called fiscal consolidation provides the general context for SRs. Although 
EU rules allow for limited annual deficits, given the amount of public debt and other 
considerations, the EU system amounts to a modern-day version of the classical doc-
trine of balanced budgets (3). A possible auxiliary hypothesis concerns the potential 
benefits from economies of scale (4), though this assumption is in some tension with 
the other elements, especially because economies of scale are not compatible with the 
model of perfect competition (1).
Elements (1)–(4) do not cover all aspects of SRs, however. SRs are also associated with 
notions such as smart growth, qualitative competitiveness, and innovations. Impor-
tantly, the current systems of (meta)governance in the EU and elsewhere have for years 
been concerned with technological change, innovation, and enterprise. To these ends, 
new techniques of government and governance have been developed (Jessop 2002, 96). 
The concepts adopted at the EU level are fed into national policy discourses. The EU has 
created for instance innovation scoreboards and a business innovation observatory to 
guide the governance practices of member states and corporations. In addition, the EU 
research funding is largely geared toward increasing innovativeness and competitive-
ness (e.g. the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation). This comple- 
ments how the purpose of the contemporary university has been redefined across the 
world in terms of success in global competition, usefulness for moneymaking, and effi-
ciency, meaning also the application of New Public Management (Mittelman 2018; Pa-
tomäki 2019a).
Rather than based on textbook neoclassical economics, these supply-side ideas ap-
pear to be linked to the revival of Joseph Schumpeter and his ideas since the 1980s 
(e.g. Fagerberg 2003). Schumpeter’s work was quintessentially concerned with change 
and he is clear that “capitalist reality is first and last a process of change” (Schumpeter 
2008, 77). This is different from the timeless models of neoclassical economics. Schum-
peter used statical analysis of equilibrium and especially the model of perfect competi-
tion as a point of contrast against which to develop a more realist, that is, dynamic and 
change-oriented economic theory. Thus, the Schumpeterian aspect would seem to add 
to the ambiguities of the concept of SR. In the following sections, I will discuss succinctly 
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these main elements one by one.
THE MAIN PROTOTYPE AND CONTRAST-SPACE  
OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
I use the term efficient market hypothesis in the broad sense, combining two different 
claims that are related to each other, though they are not the same thing. The first is 
the efficient market hypothesis developed in the context of financial market research. 
Although it has a long historical background, it is most commonly associated with Eu-
gene Fama’s work (especially Fama 1970). Fama argued that market prices effectively 
contain all the relevant information, which could affect the prices of securities (for a 
critique, e.g. Guerrien and Gun 2011). Robert Lucas (1972) and some other economists 
close to the Chicago School expanded information-efficiency to other markets through 
the idea of rational expectations. The second claim is the so-called first theorem of wel-
fare economics, according to which any Walrasian perfect competition equilibrium is 
Pareto efficient. Often, this theorem is interpreted to mean that (perfectly) competitive 
markets normally allocate resources efficiently. Theoretically, these are distinct claims, 
but for the purposes of policymaking, the expanded first claim and the second claim are 
in effect indistinguishable.
Neoclassical economics teaches “perfect” competition as a prototype of capitalist 
market economy, forming the basis of a two-dimensional contrast-space. Prototypes 
are used for categorisation. Empirical research has found that people generally do not 
reason or classify objects based on necessary and sufficient conditions, but tend to rely 
on existing prototypes (e.g. Rosch 1983). The psychological prototype theory is based 
on the idea that each category is lodged in people’s minds as an example case, which 
characterises the entire category and serves as a point of comparison for other cases (for 
example chair standing for furniture – furniture is an abstract category that cannot be 
perceived directly). Moreover, social prototypes are generally used to evaluate a situa-
tion, institutional design, or economic system. Contrast-spaces, in turn, are important 
because all explanations, as well as policy-recommendations, involve contrasts – why 
x rather than y? – which are shaped by theories, practical interests, and values (on the 
significance of contrasts, see van Fraassen 1980; Garfinkel 1981; Lawson 1997, 199-226; 
2009; Morgan and Patomäki 2017). 
The neoclassical prototype of perfect competition constitutes a generic two-dimen-
sional contrast space, defining possible options in all situations: (i) from perfect compe-
tition to imperfect competition and monopoly; and (ii) from competitive free-markets 
to varying degrees of state intervention and “command economy” (the extreme con-
trastive case that is used only negatively). These two dimensions form the basis of mi-
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cro-theory and, according to a basic mainstream assumption, macro-economics must 
have micro-foundations (for a critique, see Shaikh 2016, 75–119). Even when it is accept-
ed that competition is in fact, or even necessarily, imperfect, the model of perfect com-
petition remains a key contrast and point of comparison. The resulting simplified and 
ideal-typical contrast-space is depicted in figure 1. However unrealistic its assumptions 
may appear, the perfect competition model is routinely assumed to be relevant for ex-
planations and policy-recommendations (at least in the “long run” that is conceptually 
separate and distinct from real historical time and thus may never arrive; see Morgan 
and Patomäki, forthcoming). While the origin may be seen neither as the ultimate ideal 
nor realistic or feasible, in EU policy documents and other similar documents across the 
world, a movement from d to e is usually taken as an improvement on both dimensions. 
Markets become more perfectly competitive and market-distorting state-involvements 
reduced. This is what is habitually meant by SRs. It is worth stressing that there may be 
neoclassical economists who do not share the recommended direction in a given situ-
ation or institutional setting. For example, if an economist sees the location of the star 
in Figure 1 as the optimal point, he will disagree with the EU (or similar) recommenda-
tion. This may be, for instance, because he considers monopolistic tendencies to prevail. 
State or EU involvement is required to increase competition.
Figure 1: Structural reforms and the two-dimensional 
contrast-space of neoclassical economics
Policy-makers are of course reminded that “perfect” competition is not synonymous 
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(as Sayer, 2011, argues, we are evaluative beings whether we acknowledge it or not). The 
more competition in the neoclassical sense there is in the market, the closer the world 
must be to the ideal model. The more perfectly competitive the market, the larger the 
consumer surplus and the more optimal the situation. Many deficiencies or problems 
can be explained in terms of “market distortions”. The neoclassical contrast space thus 
breeds the normative idea that deficiencies or problems can be corrected through mak-
ing the markets more perfect and by reducing state-involvement in the economy. To 
reiterate, problems stemming from various market failures such as externalities or also 
from short-term macroeconomic fluctuations stemming, say, from “sticky prices” may 
also require state intervention. For these reasons, the origin in figure 1 is not the abso-
lute aim for anyone, although in most policy-documents the long-term oriented SRs 
seem to point toward that direction. 
A major problem is that neoclassical research itself has shown that the basic proto-
type cannot exist in any possible real world. Consider the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu 
theorem (Sonnenschein 1972; Mantel 1974; Debreu 1974). This theorem results from 
taking into account the impact of relative price changes on real income distribution, 
which is a property of the whole, in turn, impacting its parts. According to the theorem, 
market demand curves do not necessarily have a steady downward slope but can head 
in any direction at each point. It follows that a multi-market system cannot have a sin-
gle state of general equilibrium. Moreover, relaxing the necessarily false assumption of 
perfect information (which contradicts the basic epistemic principle of human fallibility, 
see e.g. Soros 2013) and accepting the existence of uncertainty and asymmetrical infor-
mation gives rise to the Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem, which in practically all situations 
invalidates the hypothesis of Pareto-efficient markets. According to this counter-theo-
rem, public-sector interventions for example through taxation can improve efficiency in 
any real-world situation (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986). Therefore, the prototype cannot 
establish the desired direction as in Figure 1.2 
Another fundamental problem is that the contrast space of neoclassical theory is 
generally much too abstract and built on impossible (and in that sense utopian) con-
cepts. All theories and models involve simplifications, abstractions, and idealisations. 
While realisticness is important, also a model that is in some ways unrealistic may be 
2 These discussions have continued for many rounds. Public choice theorists have long argued that self-
ish policymakers generate inefficiencies that are generally more harmful than market ones. Market fail-
ures are hence an insufficient condition to justify government activism. Under fundamental uncertainty, 
however, selfish policymakers cannot be conceived as maximising inter-temporal expected utility (or any 
other objective function) calculated by the use of objective probability distributions. Thus, Giuseppe Cic-
carone (2020) argues that group decision-making and mutual monitoring support earlier claims that no 
superiority of market or government over the other can a priori be established. The conclusion that the 
government cannot generally improve on market outcomes does not hence apply.
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relevant for policy. However, there are deeper forms of critique, in particular: is the ap-
proach based on realism (Lawson 1997; Sayer 2010; Patomäki 2019b)? Is the problem-
atic relevant? For a realist, an adequate causal explanation and normative assessment 
require different kinds of contrast spaces. Contrasts should be specified closer to con-
crete open-systemic historical reality and its mechanisms and processes (about more 
adequate contrast-explanation for economics, see Morgan and Patomäki 2017). Only 
in this way can theory have causal explanatory power; and only in this way can it be a 
meaningful basis for normative assessment. Denying the relevance of perfect compe-
tition means renouncing the neoclassical contrast space. If its relevance is denied, it is 
not reasonable to think that the model of perfect competition cannot give guidance to 
policy, not even negatively.
SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS 
The notion of supply-side economics emerged in the US in the late 1970s as an alterna-
tive to Keynesian, demand-side policy (Roberts 2017 explains its origins in his 1975 arti-
cle). Building on Say’s law and some other classical tenets, supply-side ideas were devel-
oped by economists such as Arthur B. Laffer and Robert A. Mundell (see e.g. Wanniski 
1978). Many contemporary economists accept, however, the Keynesian idea that lack of 
sufficient demand may occur in the short run. They may even acknowledge the possi-
bility of a relatively long-lasting disequilibrium. There is nonetheless a convergence of 
views: from a mainstream economics perspective, when demand-management is not 
a reasonable option (in the long run, or given the current situation), improving supply- 
side efficiency can be a good way to stimulate growth. 
Supply-side policies are designed to increase aggregate supply through lower taxes, 
deregulation, and productive investments. According to standard neoclassical theory, 
price incentives influence the demand or supply of a good or service. The motivation of 
employees, owners, and investors is based on costs and benefits measured in terms of 
time and money.3 This motivational assumption grounds belief in a positive connection 
between money-incentives and efficiency. The bigger the incentives and thus income 
differences, the more productive people are and the more they are willing to take risks 
as entrepreneurs, accelerating growth. Moreover, from the supply-side economics view-
point, regulations often create obstacles to free economic activities and thus hinder eco-
3 The term incentive does not in principle exclude the most varied sources of motivation, as is often point-
ed out by many mathematical modellers. For example, curiosity or moral concerns can encourage activ-
ities. In practice, however, neoclassical economists tend to assume hedonism, that is, the doctrine that 
people seek to maximise pleasure, which is typically operationalised in terms of money, free time, and 
opportunity costs (see Hodgson 2012).
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nomic growth. Deregulation may involve reducing constraints on activities or barriers 
to entry for instance in banking, utilities, telephone, the airline industries, and trans-
portation. If the market was previously a public monopoly, deregulation amounts to 
privatisation. Companies that benefit from deregulation are assumed to be able to hire 
more workers. The resultant job growth creates more demand, which further boosts 
the economy. In addition, investments in human capital or new capital equipment and 
research and development (R&D) can improve productivity. There are various ways to 
stimulate investments in the desired areas. For example, allowing businesses to depre-
ciate capital equipment more rapidly (e.g., over one year as opposed to 10), might en-
courage them to purchase such equipment. While Crespy and Vanheuverzwijn (2016, 
76) may be right in reporting a modest shift toward investments in the EU country-spe-
cific recommendations, that is in line with the concept of SR as it has been practiced in 
many places for decades.
In real-world open-systemic processes, it is difficult to disentangle different effects. 
Analysts may perceive outcomes in different ways, and similar outcomes may result 
from a variety of different causal mechanisms. Hence, the existence of drastically dif-
ferent interpretations about the effects of supply-side economics in the 1980s US is not 
surprising. Even when the data is the same, different categorisations and periodisations 
can make a major difference. A supporter of Ronald Reagan’s policies can argue that 
real economic growth averaged 3.2 percent during his tenure in office as opposed to 2.8 
percent during the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. For the same observ-
er, the US economy grew only 2.1 percent per year during the presidency of George H.W. 
Bush and the first term of Bill Clinton’s presidency (Tupy 2017). However, a report “high-
lighting President Clinton’s historic achievements” sees a different reality: “Since Pres-
ident Clinton and Vice President Gore took office, economic growth has averaged 4.0 
percent per year, compared to average growth of 2.8 percent during the Reagan-Bush 
years” (White House 1998). 
No one denies, however, that Reagan’s tax cuts decreased US federal tax revenue and 
doubled its real public debt. For some pundits, the reason for this was increased military 
spending in the 1980s, not tax cuts as such. On the other hand, it is equally plausible to 
argue that it was precisely the deficit spending that stimulated the US economy in the 
1980s. Reagan’s policies amounted to a form of military Keynesianism. Moreover, in the 
1980s, the US income inequalities started to rise rapidly. The Gini index of equivalised 
gross household income rose from 37.75% in 1979 to 41.95% in 1989 (refers to household 
income that has been recalculated to take into account differences in household size and 
composition). In 2012, it was at 46.3%. (Atkinson et al. 2017) Wealth inequalities have 
risen even more significantly (Piketty 2014).  
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ON THE APPLICABILITY OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Some “structural reforms” are based on the idea that bigger units (of for example pub-
licly provided services in education or health) are more efficient than small ones. The 
problem with this idea is that it may contradict the other elements constituting the pre-
vailing notion of SRs. If the advantages of large-scale production benefit not only the 
entire industry but also the individual companies, markets are characterised by a ten-
dency toward oligopoly or monopoly (this has been known since Sraffa 1926; 1930). In 
other words, if per-unit costs are reduced as a result of increased total output, perfect 
competition is both inefficient and unstable. 
In many industrial sectors, such as car manufacturing, economies of scale are sig-
nificant, but from the point of view of SRs, the question is where and when exactly may 
a larger scale generate more efficiency? In car manufacturing, a significant part of the 
cost is related to car design, testing, and the erection of a car plant. Making a single car 
is expensive, while in manufacturing thousands or millions of cars, the same fixed costs 
can easily be covered by car sales. In this case, the average cost per car decreases as the 
number of cars produced and sold increases. 
The following reasons are usually cited as the main benefits of large-scale industri-
al production (e.g. Sloman 1995, 172–174): (i) specialization and division of labour can 
increase efficiency; (ii) the efficient use of some machines requires a large minimum 
input; (iii) bigger machines may be more efficient; (iv) larger containers require rela-
tive smaller surface area and may thus be more economical; (v) large-scale production 
may have positive side effects, (vi) concentrating multi-step production at one location 
can reduce transport costs. Also, the scope of the firm itself can have advantages: (vii) 
centralized management can in some cases save on overlapping design; (viii) sharing 
overheads can also be economical (e.g. research lab may be costly and therefore a large 
firm can better afford such) and (ix) acquiring finance and materials is often easier for 
large firms (getting funding easily and at a lower interest rate; purchasing materials in 
large batches at lower prices). 
There is no general rule or empirical regularity according to which a larger or smaller 
size would always increase efficiency. In open systems, no law-like event-regularities ob-
tain (Lawson 1997; Patomäki 2019b). In the automotive industry, the economies of scale 
can be very significant to a point, but when it comes to teaching or medical services, a 
relatively small scale can be a prerequisite for efficiency. Most of the explanations usu-
ally given for economies of scale in industrial production do not apply to services such 
as health, education, and research, or public organizations more generally. Size does not 
automatically bring efficiency-benefits in any sector, and economies of scale have a limit 
on all sectors of industry (limits may also be set politically to prevent the concentration 
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of ownership and control of production assets). We would need to know the concrete 
mechanisms that may bring about benefits and know how to relate them to the potential 
disadvantages of large size. 
A large scale may indeed lead to many disadvantages: communication costs increase; 
decision-makers move away from substantive practices and do not see the real effects 
of their decisions; quality control is difficult and often expensive; larger scale begins 
to generate more bureaucracy; ignorance about others’ projects generates overlapping 
functions; internal power-struggles starts to dominate activities; employee alienation 
deepens and reduces motivation, etc. These are only examples. The list of relevant pro-
cesses of causation is open-ended as no list can be exhaustive (cf. Mackie 1980, e.g. 301). 
In many areas such as health and education, small is not only effective but also norma-
tively preferable for other reasons (see e.g. Johns and Torres 2005; Kokkelenberg, Dillon 
and Christy 2008; van der Wal et al. 2009).
ON THE “SCHUMPETERIAN” MOMENT
The EU structural reforms are intertwined with attempts to encourage innovations and 
growth. This aspect of SRs seems closely linked to the revival of Schumpeter and his 
theories since the 1980s. Schumpeter, like Karl Marx or Piero Sraffa (mentioned above), 
was convinced that the capitalist market economy is less stable and more dynamic than 
the orthodox market theory implies. The capitalist market economy is characterised by 
change, growth, rising living standards, innovations, and occasional huge profits based 
on temporary monopolistic privileges, but also by tendencies toward overproduction, 
excess capacity, unemployment, and maladjustment. For Schumpeter, the latter can 
have also a positive function as “creative destruction”.
In all his main works, Schumpeter (1978; 2008; 2017) distinguishes between manag-
ers, capitalists, and entrepreneurs. Managers run organizations and he considers these 
mainly in terms of a static economy. Capitalists claim a share of production in terms of 
ownership. For Schumpeter, entrepreneurs are different from both. He associates them 
with innovations, the main source of growth and change. Entrepreneurs may initially 
lack wealth or capital, but they can use finance-capital supplied through the mecha-
nisms of credit, the availability of which depends on banks and other financiers. En-
trepreneurs manage business organizations, but do not rely on customary knowledge, 
habits, and conventions – their investment, ideas energy, and novelty are sources of in-
novation and these are quintessentially sources of change and potential transformation.
While entrepreneurs are thus considered pivotal within capitalism, the relative sig-
nificance of an entrepreneur’s role within evolving capitalism is itself subject to change. 
An entrepreneur combines things in production in novel ways, making production more 
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efficient and production costs lower. An entrepreneur can bring new sources of inputs to 
the production process. He can open up new territorial markets or create new needs or 
tastes through marketing. Moreover, not only does innovation allow new organizations 
to take root and firms to increase their market shares and thereby change the market 
structure. Competitive capitalism can also evolve into something different, involving 
bureaucratically dominated firms, trusts, etc. 
Hence, in Schumpeter’s work, the fundamental characteristics of any point in time 
within a modern economy do not seem to conform to those that are typical of statical 
frameworks and equilibrium, such as those of the neoclassical model of perfect com-
petition. The adoption of Schumpeter as part of the package of SRs would thus seem to 
generate further tensions, if not contradictions, within the prevailing discourse of SRs. 
What is more, for Schumpeter the historical dynamics of capitalism tends to suppress 
entrepreneurs and their creative spirit. 
Bureaucracies are becoming increasingly dominant not only through public organi-
sations but equally well within large-scale firms – as was indicated by the new theory of 
the firm in management and some strands of economics that emerged in the 1950s and 
1960s. The scope for individual entrepreneurial innovation is superseded by the work 
of corporate specialist research and development teams.4 More and more of economic 
and social life is conducted based on formal rules, and this is shadowed by an influential 
technocratic interventionist social science. For Schumpeter, this kind of emerging socie-
ty and economy is less likely to produce agents able to fulfil the entrepreneurial function 
(substituting management and trustification for prior forms of leadership). The rising 
technocrats are more likely to intervene to dampen cycles, effectively weakening “cre-
ative destruction”. According to Schumpeter, this has socialising effects that will tend 
to militate against the emergence of entrepreneurial individuals, whilst simultaneously 
working to cultivate a more corporatist-collective or socialist-leaning frame of mind, 
which larger and impersonal business and administrative organizations will likely fa-
cilitate.
The Schumpeterian heritage is contested. Schumpeter’s concepts and ideas can be 
integrated with a variety of different theories and developed into different directions. 
Also the Schumpeter revival of the 1980s changed meanings. Hence, the SR discourse 
4 In mainstream economics, this and related claims have led to the so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis 
that innovation is associated with firm size or market concentration. A number of researchers have ex-
plored the relationship between innovation and firm size or concentration and frequency of innovation. 
As a telling example of the methodological (including ontological) problems of the approach, these studies 
have been inconclusive (for a review of studies from the 1960s to 1980s, Acs and Audretsch 1988, 130–32; 
for a review of more recent studies, Block, Fisch and van Praag 2017; see also e.g. Symeonidis 1996; there 
have been also many case studies, for example Kinugasa 1998). Hardly anything can be said at this level of 
abstraction. Relevant contrast-spaces must be specified closer to historical realities.
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about innovations and change in capitalist processes is not based on Schumpeter’s own 
conception of the entrepreneur. Rather neoliberal theorists such as Ludwig von Mises 
and Israel Kirzner redefined the entrepreneur as a homo oeconomicus that under un-
certainty can take advantage of opportunities presented by the market process. Thus 
reconceptualised, an entrepreneur does not have to be creative in the Schumpeterian 
sense, just alert and responsive to market opportunities. For many economists, the per-
ceived problem has been the wide range of restrictions on entrepreneurship and the 
lack of sufficient incentives to act under uncertainty (Plehwe 2020). This neoliberal re-
interpretation resonates strongly with the basic ideas of supply-side economics and its 
aims to deregulate, lower rates of taxation, and weaken trade unions. This may be taken 
to reduce the level of ambiguity in SR programmes, yet it in no way makes these pro-
grammes more adequate or functional.
In anticipation of the social ontological discussion below, it is at this point worth 
mentioning that theories and ideologies not only constitute markets (MacKenzie, Mu-
niesa and Siu 2007) but also forms of subjectivity and principles of governance. The 
tendency to universalise a particular understanding of social being – everyone is an 
entrepreneur – becomes, in the next moment, a project of deliberate social engineering. 
This project is about creating a world in which everyone must become an “entrepre-
neur” in some sense, also within organisations. The problem is that in open systems 
social engineering tends to have unintended consequences.5 However, before discussing 
open systems and social ontology further, in the next section I will briefly outline the 
development of the concept of structure in social sciences.
A BRIEF GENEALOGY OF THE CONCEPT  
OF STRUCTURE IN SOCIAL SCIENCES
So far, I have analysed the conceptual and theoretical constitution of the direction of 
EU structural reforms. Now I turn my attention to the concept of “structure”. The term 
structure comes from Latin structura meaning “a fitting together, adjustment; a build-
ing, mode of building”, which is derived from structus, past participle of struere, “to 
5 For example, this type of social engineering can reduce efficiency, because policies designed for self-in-
terested actors understood as ”entrepreneurs”, often within organisations, can undermine their moral 
sentiments, experiences of autonomy, and thereby both their capacities and motivation (Bowles 2008). 
The unintended effects may also be political. For example, labour market ”flexibility” tends to increase 
existential insecurity through conditions of employment and life prospects and thereby breed conditions 
for the rise of nationalist-authoritarian populism (Patomäki forthcoming). Moreover, rational choice the-
ories have frequently been used as arguments against political participation and democracy; in everyday 
use, they can erode trust in politicians and democratic institutions (see Mackie 2009).
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pile, place together”.6 At first, in early modern Europe, it was used to refer to constructs, 
edifices, or buildings. Metaphorical extensions emerged much later. In the 19th century, 
Karl Marx and later Emile Durkheim introduced the concept to social sciences. In 
Capital Vol 1 Marx refers to his 1859 manuscripts and writes:
[E]ach special mode of production and the social relations corresponding 
to it, in short, that the economic structure of society, is the real basis on 
which the juridical and political superstructure is raised and to which defi-
nite social forms of thought correspond […] (Marx 2010, 57, fn. 34)
Marx also wrote about the structure of society, class structure, etc. For Durkheim, in 
turn, the concept refers to the interdependent and organised parts of the whole. Any one 
individual is only a single element within the totality of relationships that constitutes a 
society. Society has formative power over its parts and exists as normative order that 
predates the individual and is reproduced and transformed mostly quite independently 
of him or her (see Giddens 1971, 65–118). From this perspective, Durkheim theorised, 
among other things, the effects of the division of labour and social complexity on the 
normative order of society, for example in terms of anomie that affects how individuals 
exist and behave. Later structuralist traditions in linguistic, anthropology, and sociolo-
gy have regularly used the term in these and related senses, referring to the relations of 
an interdependent and organised whole, possibly conceived in terms of process, that is, 
as something that evolves.
The concept of structure did not play any specific role in economic theory before 
the Second World War. For example, Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1959) men-
tions social or industrial structure only occasionally and usually in a sense that was 
not that different from Marx or Durkheim, although sometimes coming close to mere 
composition (for the tensions between the sociohistorical and equilibrium aspects of 
Marshall, see Morgan and Patomäki forthcoming). Paul Samuelson’s textbook Econom-
ics from 1948 that forged a synthesis of neoclassical and Keynesian economics is similar 
in this regard. Structure is sometimes a composition (e.g. of prices or interest rates), 
but sometimes relational, for instance when Samuelson writes about the “structure of 
corporations” (1948, 128–33) or “structure of American unions” (188). Terms such as 
“structural change” and “structural adjustment” were in sporadic use already during 
the interwar years and in the Bretton Woods era, but in a variety of meanings, stem-
ming from different traditions and political orientations (Crespy and Vanheuverzwijn 
2016, 65–8; Bockman 2019). These meanings were roughly in line with Marx, Durk-
6 Https://www.etymonline.com/word/structure#etymonline_v_22198 (accessed 15.2.2021).
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heim, and the early economists, including much of Marshall and Samuelson, although 
sometimes a few authors may have made reference to the neoclassical conception of 
market equilibrium.7
It was only in the subsequent decades that the standardised textbook corpus of 
mainstream economics took shape and provided the basis for the rise of the neoliberal 
concept of SR in the 1980s, grounded on the claims discussed above (balanced budg-
ets, efficient markets, supply-side economics, scale economies, the idea of the entrepre-
neur, etc.). In its currently prevailing meaning, the term became dominant in the 1980s 
through the IMF, World Bank, and OECD and their attempts to push for changes in the 
developing and OECD countries alike, often under the euphemism of “structural adjust-
ment”. For example, when the 1985 World Economic Outlook (IMF 1985, 6) argued in 
favour of “a more effective approach to structural problems in European countries”, the 
basic idea was that as various “rigidities and distortions” are impeding the free opera-
tion of market forces, they should be removed. 
A related idea is the crowding out argument according to which “higher government 
deficits tend to generate short-term increases in activity at the expense of reducing the 
share of private sector saving that is available for investment to support longer-term 
growth” (8). The 1989 Report (World Bank 1989, 6) makes the familiar neoclassical 
distinction between the short and long runs and points out that some countries have 
been more “successful than others in pursuing short-term adjustment and longer-term 
structural reform”. Mainly, the EU has followed this globally propagated conception of 
SRs, which includes most or all the main elements (1)–(4) as well as the “Schumpeteri-
an” moment discussed above. To reiterate, the problem is not only that the assumptions 
of the basic models of perfect competition, supply-side economics, and such like, are 
not realistic, but also that the overall approach to social science is lacking realism at the 
deeper philosophical and social ontological level.
TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL  
STRUCTURES AND THEIR CAUSAL POWERS
At the most basic level, the problem of the prevailing conception of structural change 
is ontological. Therefore, the next step is to discuss the meaning of structure from the 
point of view of contemporary social ontology (e.g. Searle 1995; 2010; Lawson 1997; 
7 An interesting line of enquiry, suggested by Magnus Ryner, would consist of exploring the concept of 
structure in what may be called the structural school in development economics, or more simply, struc-
turalists economics, associated with names such as Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado, Gunnar Myrdal, Albert 
O. Hirschman, and Arthur Lewis. They wrote their main works from the 1950s to 1980s, adopting con-
cepts variously from neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian theories, while often using the term “struc-
ture” in a sociological (perhaps especially in the Durkheimian) sense of the term.
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2019; Patomäki 2020).  As already indicated, the term “structure” is normally used in 
connection with relational wholes (as in Durkheim) or compositions (the way in which a 
whole or mixture is made up). In neoclassical theory, when it is not conceived as a mere 
constraint on efficient markets, structure tends to mean the latter, often coming down 
to the number of units in a given market (“market structure”) or, sometimes, the degree 
of public involvement in the economy. It is not illegitimate as such to define structures in 
a compositional way (e.g. “structure of market”, “age structure”, or “occupational struc-
ture”). However, from a causal analysis point of view, it is necessary to examine substan-
tial relations of connection and interaction, rather than mere formal relations of simi-
larity and dissimilarity, quantities, or ratios of quantities in a given context. To perform 
causal analysis, compositions should be interpreted in relational terms, translated into 
them, or explained through relational conceptions. Social structures are real and this 
can be shown with causal criteria. As the ever-present condition (material-formal cause) 
and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency, historical social structures 
are essential elements of social causation (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1998; Patomäki 1991). 
  A key point of contact between human agency and social structures in a complex 
society is the mediating system of positions (places, functions, tasks, duties, commit-
ments, rights, etc.) occupied (filled, assumed, enacted, etc.) by individuals, and of the 
practices (activities, etc.) in which, by virtue of their occupancy of these positions (and 
vice versa), they engage. Certain meanings of “structural reforms” in the prevailing dis-
course come close to a relational understanding of structure. For instance, the fulfilment 
of a position in the positioned practices of an economic organisation may require spe-
cific skills and know-how. The system of relations between positioned practices which 
agents reproduce or transform involves also the educational system that produces skills 
and know-how and, most importantly, their generic prerequisites (training to specific 
tasks can take place within organizations). Absences too can be caused. The absence of 
particular competencies can be a consequence of organising the educational system in a 
particular way. This absence can have causal effects on the capacities and development 
of economic organisations. 
From this perspective, the mere number of units or the degree of public involvement 
in a given market is indeterminate with regard to outcomes. To illustrate, consider An-
war Shaikh’s (2016, 14, 259–326) theory of real competition. Real competition is antag-
onistic and stormy. Its intensity is independent of the number of firms in the market. 
All seek profits, but many suffer losses, some barely surviving from year to year while 
others go bankrupt or out of business, or are bought by other firms. On the other hand, 
winners may from time to time make huge profits, especially in an upswing. Profitable 
markets attract. There are barriers to entry, however. For those trying to overcome these 
barriers, competition is often war, involving “tactics” and “strategy”. The whole is there-
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fore relational, not atomistic, and it evolves. Each firm seeks to achieve relative strategic 
and tactical advantages and convince buyers. In addition, structures of ownership are 
complex and relational and can shape the outcomes in many ways. The firms may also 
try to shape rules and principles for their own benefit, often through legislation. Hence, 
the neoclassical contrast-space looks hollow: the mere number of units does not have 
any direct bearing on causation.
Structural reforms concern rule-constituted and -generated social relations and sys-
tems (including organizations), the positioned practices of which are (re)produced by 
individual actors. Rational reforms require knowledge about the likely real effects of the 
proposed reforms. Social systems are open and cause-effect relationships are inherent-
ly complex. Many interconnected processes whose mutual relationships are changing 
shape each process. Rules and practices, as well as social relations and systems, are 
open and changing. There are no general regularities that would be valid everywhere. 
Still, many relatively enduring connections can be found as not all relations, structures 
and mechanisms change all the time. In open systems, we can use knowledge about 
contrastive demi-regularities and their underlying causes to help design economic pol-
icy, but only cautiously and with reservations. The word “contrastive” indicates that 
demi-regularities must be defined in terms of differences and contrasts across time-
space regions (Lawson 1997, 199–204). Demi-regularities are susceptible to change. 
Their explanation requires qualitative and historical knowledge about relational social 
structures, processes, and mechanisms (Næss 2004). 
This kind of realist social ontology explains not only the absence of universal invar-
iances and rapid changes in the social world (these have been explored for instance by 
Marx and Schumpeter) but also the increasingly central role of reflexivity in changes 
in the political economy and society more generally. The so-called Goodhart’s law says 
that “any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed 
upon it for control purposes” (Goodhart 1981, 116). Similarly, the famous “Lucas cri-
tique” includes the idea that any policy change will alter the structure of econometric 
models (Lucas 1976). While the reality is more nuanced and complex than what these 
formulations may entail, there is a kernel of truth in them: any announced policy change 
can become a self-altering prediction (or involve such a prediction), which is subject to 
contradictory and complementary determination, resulting in either net self-fulfilling 
or self-denying tendency. 
What is important is that from this perspective the EU system of macroeconomic 
(meta)governance, which relies pivotally on anticipations of future growth paths, in-
volves not only reflexive predictions but also feedback loops and performativity. The 
current EU system, driven by the aim “to balance budgets”, is an example of an insti-
tutionalized reflexive loop that is geared toward an implicit political aim of downsizing 
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and transforming the state. Because of these loops and effects, attempts to reduce pub-
lic debt can turn out to be self-defeating and recessionary. The system involves a high 
likelihood of net self-fulfilling tendency toward harmful socioeconomic outcomes. (See 
Patomäki 2019c, 564–8). In the next section, I will indicate how reflexivity can play a 
much more positive role as well.
A REALIST CONCEPTION OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS
In most social sciences, the term “structure” continues to have a more realistically de-
scriptive meaning than in neoclassical economics. The starting point is not a compar-
ison to any technically and mathematically represented tacit utopia such as “perfect 
competition” or “general equilibrium”, but the historical evolvement of real social rela-
tions, processes, and their effects in open systems. Structures emerge from rules that 
constitute and regulate identities, relationships, and practices. People’s activities consist 
of positioned practices, and in doing so they follow rules and improvise on them. In 
their practical activities, they renew and, from time to time shape social relationships. 
Internal (constitutive) and external (causal) relations form part of broader and multifac-
eted contexts, complexes, systems, and fields. Social wholes change with their parts, but 
wholes are also co-formative of their parts and condition their possible changes. These 
relations are context-dependent.
A variety of normative meanings can be ascribed to any reform-proposal. From any 
given normative vantage point, structures can be changed and made better, but they can 
also be made worse. Frequently the latter happens through unintended consequences, 
but there may also be conflicts between values. Apart from effects on efficiency, chang-
es may also purport to increase freedom, justice, and well-being or they may aim to 
strengthen democracy or sustainability, or further several values at the same time. From 
this point of view, a structural change can mean, for example, transformations of a set 
of rules and principles defining a public organization or an enterprise (e.g. purpose or 
ownership), or a change in power relationships (e.g. democratization). Such changes are 
best considered as ethical and political, not technical. What kind of structural change 
increases for example efficiency, well-being, or fairness, is contingent. The success of a 
structural change depends on both the immediate context and its wider context.
Although it may be possible to demonstrate links between certain relational struc-
tures and, for example, efficiency in open systems, these links tend to change. Assump-
tions about the independence of the parts of relational contexts and excessive general-
izations based on this kind of atomist reductionism are likely to produce unintended 
consequences, which are often harmful (Garfinkel 1981, chp. 5). For instance, the neo-
classical agenda of SRs customarily includes privatisation of public activities and com-
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panies (for a critique of the theoretical underpinnings of privatisation, see e.g. Wright 
1991). Assessments of the real impact of privatisation vary and are theory- and ideolo-
gy-laden, but most evaluative studies conclude that the results are sector-specific and 
regularly mixed or inconclusive (compare e.g. Frangakis et.al. 2009, stressing negative 
impacts, and Zartaloudis 2010, stressing context-dependent and mixed results). Priva-
tisation also means different things in different parts of the world – where both the pre-
vailing practices and institutions and the purpose of privatisation may differ. In many 
well-known cases such as British railways, however, there is a near-consensus accord-
ing to which “rail privatisation has resulted in considerable additional costs: it was a ma-
jor public policy error” (McCartney and Stittle 2017, 1). Next, I will argue, however, that 
normative assessment is not only a matter of utilitarian and money-based cost-benefit 
analysis but rather involves explicit ethical and political arguments.
WIDENING THE MEANING OF RATIONALITY
In neoclassical economics, rationality is understood in terms of a technical apparatus 
that enables optimisation under constraints (see Fine 2016). The procedures of mechan-
ical optimisation make it desirable to attempt to express all benefits and costs in a com-
mon scale or denominator so that they can be compared with each other. In theoretical 
models, optimisation requires only abstract preference orderings by individuals. The 
so-called Pareto principle says that if one individual is made better off and none are 
made worse off because of implementing a policy, social welfare increases. This con-
servative criterion does not allow for redistribution, although some extensions may do 
so in a limited fashion. Moreover, in practical applications the most typical common 
denominator is money. Whereas the welfarism principle means that social orderings of 
alternative policies depend only on the welfare of individuals defined in terms of prefer-
ences and not on extraneous considerations such as freedom, justice, or democracy, in 
practice this principle regularly comes down to maximising output measured in terms 
of money. There is certain circularity because the likely impact of X is then estimated 
through the neoclassical models discussed above (based on efficient markets hypothe-
sis, supply-side economics, scale economies, etc.).
The paradox of the methodology of neoclassical economics is of course that this 
conception of rationality is self-defeating when applied to research. If what is true is 
reduced to what optimises under constraints, and if the economists themselves have a 
preference order regarding their own good or social arrangements, then it is rational for 
the economists to build models that either maximise their welfare or help to realise their 
preference order regarding different social arrangements. There is no place for truth, 
genuine values, or normative principles. What is more, this compound involves an epis-
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temic closure. Because social systems are open, decisive tests between theories are hard 
to come by. This makes it easy to fortify ideological positions. Given the absence of both 
a normatively regulating concept of truth and decisive test situations, coupled with con-
tinuing one-sided allegiance to a mere predictive rather than causal-explanatory and 
other criteria, the methodology on which one’s research relies gets mystified. The en-
trenched or otherwise privileged theory is protected and alternatives are stunt. There 
may also be a belief in the unresolvability of theoretical conflicts – which in practice 
means their resolution in favour of the status quo or accordance with one’s preferences. 
(Bhaskar 1998, 144) 
This is not rational. Being rational means being open to criticism (also based on ev-
idence regarding real-world effects) and having the ability to learn. There are several 
forms of rationality including instrumental, normative, and expressive. All of them are 
subordinate to critical communication based on evidence and plausible reasoning. (See 
Habermas 1984) All our claims of validity can be criticised and disproved; all our claims 
call for intersubjective justification, which we must provide upon request. Science is 
based on the hypothetical analysis and examination of truth claims and normative 
claims. It would be thus wrong to equate science with one or two special research meth-
ods or a specific set of substantive assumptions. Science is not synonymous with math-
ematical modelling, regression analysis, or rationalistic mechanics tied to neoclassical 
assumptions. Each of these may be part of some scientific practices in some contexts. 
The viability of research methods or substantive assumptions can only be determined 
by considering their real grounds in a context. 
Rational science is reflexive and self-critical. It is conscious of the social-psycholog-
ical and ideological mechanisms that influence our observations and reasoning. Falsi-
fication – the attempt to disprove a proposed hypothesis – is essential to science but 
must not be confused with any particular method of hypothesis testing. For example, 
mathematical modelling is premised on the existence of invariant event-regularities, yet 
there are ontological reasons why social sciences, including economics, have been not 
been able to identify universal regularities. In open systems, things can and do change. 
Moreover, causation is complex and any process is open to extrinsic influences, howev-
er the process is defined. Political economists should not give up simply because their 
object of study is a diverse, historically changing, and normative reality. The mission of 
science is to study reality as it is, on its terms, as precisely and in as great detail as the 
research object allows, and this should also be the basis of normative judgements (Pa-
tomäki 1992; 2006; 2018). 
It is our task to collect information from manifold sources, using a wide range of 
methods and various social traditions, constantly changing the historical time scale 
from very brief to very long. The goal is to use theoretical and conceptual work to syn-
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thesise available information into understandable and truthful explanatory models and 
stories that help us apply our practical reason, that is, act ethically and wisely in each 
context-bound situation (Spicker 2016). Ultimately, the significance of social research 
lies in the future, because practical action is future-oriented. To show what this may 
mean in practice, I will next give some examples of alternative possible structural re-
forms in the EU and global political economy more generally.
A FEW EXAMPLES OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE  
STRUCTURAL REFORMS FOR THE 2020S
It is time to give a few examples of alternative SRs to make my abstract social theo-
retical and philosophical points more concrete. Although I consider these ideas to be 
important for the future of the EU, the main emphasis lies in the meaning of structural 
reforms. It should be mentioned, however, that some of the currently prevailing SRs are 
in line with this vision. For instance, attempts to prevent tax evasion, or to make the 
skills of potential employees and the needs of employers meet, seem well justified, as 
they can stem from a realist analysis of causal processes. 
Going beyond the existing vision, we must first specify reflexively what the concrete 
geo-historical problems are. The point is to shape the entity or process instigating the 
examination and initiating the need for action. Given the current conjunctures and com-
pounds, deindustrialization appears a key problem, especially outside the German-cen-
tred industrial region. There is a need for selective reindustrialization. Industrial capac-
ities are not given but depend on the level of investments. While it may look inevitable 
that industrial employment will continue to decline, it is possible to reindustrialise part-
way through large-scale public investments, geared toward projects that matter and are 
sustainable both socially and ecologically. 
Already Schumpeter stressed that investments involve the development of new qual-
ities and abilities. However, Schumpeter paid only scant attention to the role of the state 
or public authorities more generally in creating the grounds for commercial innovation. 
Moreover, he had only little to say about the potential benefits from non-commercial-
ised scientific progress supported by public authorities. As Mariana Mazzucato (2014) 
argues, strategic public investments and policies can create and shape productive pow-
ers and markets. The creation of production-powers and markets can also be achieved 
through “mission-oriented investments that led to putting a man on the moon and are 
currently galvanizing green innovation” (Mazzucato 2016, 140). At the level of the EU as 
a whole, the structures needed for these kinds of purposes remain mostly absent. From 
this viewpoint, a key structural change is to create sufficient capacities for fiscal and 
industrial policy at the EU level. 
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Common fiscal policy requires both inflationary and deflationary tools. This indi-
cates that taxes too are needed. Taxes are vital not only for deflationary purposes but 
also for redistribution and shaping behaviour toward desirable directions. Redistribu-
tive systems could include for example proper regional policies, a European minimum 
wage, and an EU-wide unemployment benefit scheme. Essential transformations are 
not possible without changing the EU Treaty, including in terms of its regulatory frame-
work for macroeconomic policy. However, until the EU Treaty is changed, EU-level in-
vestment programmes can rely on creative arrangements involving central bank fund-
ing, as exemplified by the Covid-19 recovery package and “unconventional” monetary 
policies of the ECB. Moreover, through the enhanced cooperation procedure, groups of 
member states can take steps toward realising European taxes benefitting special funds 
or the EU budget.
A key effect of globalization has been that states’ power to tax corporations and 
wealth has eroded. Corporate tax has fallen dramatically (tens of percent) in most 
countries. Besides, large multinational companies and wealthy individuals engage in 
aggressive “tax planning”, which further reduces tax revenues. Collective action and in-
stitution-building are indispensable to counter these trends and tendencies. Corporate 
taxation has been under discussion in the EU, with concrete proposals on the table. The 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) would abolish harmful corporate 
tax planning within Europe to a large degree by creating a single set of rules for how 
corporations operating within the EU calculate their taxes. A more ambitious version of 
that proposal would involve an agreement on a common minimum corporate tax rate – 
say 30% – which is substantially higher than the average corporate tax rate in the EU. 
The states participating in the CCCTB could treat a part of the revenues as a common 
tax even in the absence of treaty-change.
The problem of tax evasion is not only European but as well global, so the CCCTB is 
best conceived as a mere component in a general attempt to regulate value chains and 
global corporate power. Hence, SRs should concern also worldwide institutions. Con-
sider the case of trade. Many states, and the EU as a whole, are committed to improv-
ing their current account balance by enhancing their “competitiveness”, often through 
lowering export prices. Yet current account deficits and surpluses cancel each other out, 
while attempts to increase cost competitiveness through internal devaluation and such 
like tend to prove contradictory due to decreasing effective demand. What is needed to 
overcome this contradiction is a collective mechanism through which world trade sur-
pluses and deficits are automatically balanced in terms of tax-and-transfer; and a global 
central bank that can issue global reserve money (as originally proposed by Keynes in 
the 1940s; for discussions and further developments, see for instance Davidson 1992–3; 
Stiglitz and Greenwald 2010).
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As local and global improvements are closely interwoven, it is necessary to increase 
and intensify political collaboration across the world. This process involves support for 
workers’ rights and trade unionization on a planetary scale, both out of solidarity and to 
increase global aggregate demand. Better working conditions and salaries, for example 
to the Chinese workers, could mean fewer reasons for capital relocation and more de-
mand for European goods and services in China. Deepened global political cooperation 
could over time lead to the formation of new kinds of actors. A further possibility is to 
realise a universal right to high-quality education. This could be facilitated by various 
global means, including global tax revenues. The practical realization of this right can 
be seen (i) as an attempt to build human capital as the basis of sustainable growth, (ii) 
as an attempt to speed up the process of demographic transition, (iii) as a mechanism 
for global redistribution, and (iv) as an example of what enlightenment and global soli-
darity can mean in the 21st century.
SRs are needed also at the level of work organizations to improve their functioning. 
The long-standing but unresolved debate between the advocates of hierarchy and de-
mocracy has often revolved around efficiency. Is democracy or hierarchy more efficient? 
Efficiency is important but not the only consideration. In a good society, work is organ-
ized so that everyone has the opportunity to enjoy social recognition and some self-real-
ization in her work. From an open-systemic point of view, there are many possible ways 
of organising things, involving considerations of meaningfulness and motivation. SRs 
could aim at building society around voluntary partnership and democratic cooperation 
rather than competition and greed. Overall, this is not a matter that can be resolved at 
the level of high theory but requires practical experimentation and systematic learning 
from these experiments. 
The envisioned programme of structural changes would amount to reversing the cur-
rent EU strategy for growth. Proactive economic policies aim to create investments and 
capacity and increase output and thus reduce unemployment, which is a major source of 
insecurity. A sufficiently high-level basic income for all European citizens could further 
diminish dependence on unstable markets. Whether universal basic income (UBI) is 
worthy of support depends on how it is implemented. For instance, UBI should not be 
seen as a replacement for public systems of health and education. Probably UBI func-
tions best in a world of full employment where republican virtues prevail and where 
people are motivated to work and participate. 
Moreover, participation is important also because it can generate trust and existen-
tial security. Many forms of participation concern collective will-formation. SRs could 
aim at democratising power-relations also within firms, making personal employment 
paths more secure, and shaping political economy developments in the desired direction 
by employing industrial and other policies. The goal, in this conception of SRs, would 
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be to create an upward spiral of virtuous developments. This spiral could be grounded 
in existential security and trust, encouraging hope for better futures. The European 
project could thus become a project generating hope about the future.
Industrial production will remain critically important because of the context-bound 
benefits of economies of scale and related possibilities for increasing labour productivi-
ty. It is essential to retain industrial know-how as widely and deeply as possible. Growth 
comes from the diversity and complexity of production, enabling the development of 
new industries. The key to developing industrial know-how lies in research and develop-
ment and, perhaps, in some sense, in “entrepreneurship”, which may also be organised 
publicly as Mazzucato has argued. What is more, H.G. Wells envisaged a century ago, in 
his Outline of History, a future world in which “perhaps 10% or more of the adult popu-
lation will, at some point or another in their lives, be workers in the world’s educational 
organization”. Wells also envisaged “a vast free literature of criticism and discussion” 
(Wells 1931, 1163). Today we can set a new target: in the future, at least 10% of the adult 
population will work at universities or research institutes for a major part of their lives. 
The aim of these kinds of SRs – both relational and compositional – is freedom from 
false necessities. SRs may involve various post-Keynesian and global-Keynesian ide-
as about rational economic policy. Whenever feasible, however, the point is to identify 
old and new ways to make relations of production, work organizations, and systems of 
global governance more empowering (cf. Unger 1997; Wright 2010; Honneth 2017). This 
kind of programme could combine the aim of full employment with transformations 
of society’s power structures, which can, in turn, shape economic efficiency in the spir-
it of social experimentalism. The open-systemic social world is frequently dilemmatic, 
however, and can respond to any policy or transformation reflexively and in unexpected 
ways. History will remain open-ended.
CONCLUSIONS
Decades of neoliberal “structural reforms” have not succeeded in making the EU-Euro-
pean economy fitter and better able to realise its growth potential. The fragile recovery 
after the extended Euro crisis did not last long – a new recession was already starting 
before the Covid-19 crisis. Lessons must be learnt from these experiences. However, 
learning is difficult if things are only looked at from the perspective of standard text-
book economics. As discussed in this paper, although the prevailing EU ideas about SRs 
are not reducible to the logic and contrast space of neoclassical economics (as depicted 
e.g. in Figure 1), they are constitutive of the dominant direction of SRs. I have thus ex-
amined critically the conceptual underpinnings of SRs, including the efficient market 
hypothesis, supply-side economics, scale economies, and quasi-Schumpeterian innova-
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tion, all currently applied within the prevailing balanced budget framework.
I have also shown that the current economistic concept of structure is different from 
the main 19th and 20th century social scientific understandings. Moreover, the concept 
of structure did not play any major role in economics before the 1970s and 1980s when 
it started to be associated with the rising ideas of neoliberalism, including the efficient 
market hypothesis, supply-side economics, etc. At that point, “structure” came to be 
seen primarily as an impediment to the optimal functioning of the market as defined 
by the (utopian) model of perfect competition; or defined in terms of an arrangement 
that can facilitate the optimal functioning of the market. However, this conception is 
conceptually confusing and the related empirical evidence is hazy. A realist concept of 
structure based on the notion of open systems explains why the neoliberal conception 
has not worked. At a more fundamental level, I have argued that the relevance of the 
neoclassical problematic is highly questionable. 
The principal social scientific concept of structure has been causal-descriptive rather 
than tacitly utopian (in the sense of neoclassical economics). Society has formative pow-
er over its parts and exists as normative order that predates the individual and is repro-
duced and transformed mostly quite independently of him or her. From the perspective 
of a realist social ontology, the economistic idea, as well as the related quasi-Schumpete-
rian idea of an entrepreneur, have constituted a project of deliberate social engineering. 
A key problem is that in open systems social engineering tends to have unintended con-
sequences. I have argued further that the current EU system of macroeconomic (meta)
governance involves a high likelihood of net self-fulfilling tendency toward harmful so-
cioeconomic outcomes. It is thus not surprising that decades of applying these recipes 
have not led to the resurgence of EU-Europe.
The starting point of a realist social ontology is open systems, the intra- and inter-
related elements of which are socially constructed. From this viewpoint, structural re-
forms concern rule-constituted and -generated social relations and systems organised 
as wider wholes, whereas positioned practices are reproduced and transformed by in-
dividual actors. Rational reforms require knowledge about the likely real causal effects 
of the proposed reforms. The problem from the point of view of rational SRs is that 
social systems are open and changeable and that causation is complex. Although some 
rational anticipations are possible, this kind of social ontology suggests an experimental 
approach to structural reforms. We do not know any universal principles of historical 
change or consequences of such changes because the mechanisms of change vary with 
the social contexts we are examining.
Proposals for SRs must thus be concrete and based on a historical diagnosis of the 
currently most salient problems. In this paper, I have suggested several SRs that would 
amount to reversing the current EU strategy for growth. Although the main point is to 
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show what kinds of SRs the alternative realist conception of structure can facilitate, I 
also believe that this kind of programme would make a major difference. The goal is to 
create an upward spiral of virtuous developments. This spiral fosters existential securi-
ty and trust, encouraging hope for better futures among the EU citizenry. Some of the 
proposed SRs concern building new structures and powers at the EU level, especially in 
terms of fiscal and industrial policy (for a discussion on the implications to democratic 
legitimacy, Patomäki 2014). These powers are needed for instance for a European-wide 
industrial policy and a programme of selective – that is, socially and ecologically sus-
tainable – reindustrialisation. 
Collective action and institution-building are indispensable to attempts to tackle 
worldwide tax evasion. In general, local, European and global improvements are close-
ly interwoven, and thus it is necessary to increase and intensify political collaboration 
across the world and build new worldwide structures and powers. Furthermore, in this 
vision, SRs would aim at making personal employment paths more secure and democ-
ratising power-relations also within firms. This vision also includes the expansion of 
higher education and research on an unprecedented scale.
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